



“Regime of Truth” and Possibilities of Trans–National History in Japan and China

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Trans–national history—history written specifically for readers in more than one country—has become more than just an intellectual exercise, but also a political endeavor in East Asia as well as elsewhere. In early 2002, the Japanese and Korean governments signed an agreement, to establish a Joint Historical Research Project. According to one counting, there are half a dozen current efforts among East Asian historians and educators to create common history textbooks. Joint conferences are too numerous to count. Perhaps one of the most ambitious collaborative projects has been that organized by Ezra Vogel, of Harvard University which brings together historians from Japan, China, and the US to study the local, military, and diplomatic aspects of the Sino–Japanese War (1931–1945).¹

This phenomenon is largely a response to the conflicting interpretations over Japan’s record of colonialism and war in the early 20th century that has often erupted into the diplomatic arena in East Asia. Such cross–national endeavors, necessary and well intentioned as they no doubt are, are fraught with difficulties. These difficulties are both political as well as intellectual. As we all know, history writing is not just as an intellectual exercise among academics; it is shaped by specific social–political conditions. Public history projects in particular, school textbooks and museum exhibits among them, must satisfy both intellectual integrity and public support.²

If writing for one national audience is often difficult enough, how can historians meet the challenge of writing for different national societies? To be sure, those who believe in Universal Truth or the scientific nature of history

writing may reject this question as unnecessary. Others, who see historical truth as constructed—not out of thin air but on the basis of historical evidence and interpretation, would disagree. The question, then, becomes how to make reconstruction of the past succeed in convincing a trans-national audience. One concept that I have found helpful when thinking about the deeper causes of the conflict over the past and the possibilities of trans-national history in East Asia is Michel Foucault's Regime of Truth. According to Foucault, each society has its "general politics" of truth:

- * the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true;
- * the mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the means by which each is sanctioned;
- * the techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth;
- * the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true.³

We are of course confronted with the question: Is this regime of truth, which Foucault equates with "society", synonymous with the nation-state? Not necessarily. Class, ethnic community within a nation-state may well have their own criteria of truth. At the same time, there is no denial that nation-state has emerged as a powerful custodian of the past for the public. If so, then can there be a trans-national/societal regime of truth?

In this short paper, I will first discuss a recent case that seems to have divided the Chinese and Japanese historians. I then discuss general conditions of nationalism and the historical profession in these two countries. I also briefly explore other factors that affect popular historical consciousness, as well as problems involved in trans-national history. I argue that historians in pursuit trans-national history, between Japan and China for instance, should be aware of the different regime of truth in these countries; they should also realize the role non-historians play in such regimes.

THE "AZUMA PHENOMENON"

On December 22, 1998, the Tokyo Higher Court rejected the appeal by Azuma Shirô on the ground that atrocious behaviors described in his

published diary were considered incredulous. Azuma, then aged 86, was a former veteran in the Imperial Japanese army that fought in Nanjing and other parts of China. In 1987, he went public with two other veterans and revealed, on the basis of his diary, that the Japanese army had committed various atrocities in China.⁴ In 1993, the Aoki shoten published his diary under the title *Our Nanking Platoon: The Nanjing Massacre according to a Conscript*. Excerpts of his diary also appeared in several of the growing number of publications on the controversial subject of the Nanjing Massacre. Azuma's confession, while welcomed by many, met with condemnation from some in Japan. One of his comrades, who was accused in his diary of having killed a Chinese resident of Nanjing in a gruesome manner, filed a defamation suit against Azuma and several other writers who used his sources as well as their publisher. In 1996, the Tokyo Lower Court found Azuma and company guilty, and ordered the defendants to pay 500,000 yen to the plaintiff and publicly apologize. Azuma appealed the verdict, only to be rejected two years later.

By the time he made his appeals, Azuma had already become a well-known household name in China. This was due to the extensive Chinese media coverage on the case. Azuma visited China on several occasions since 1994, for the purpose of atoning for his own crimes, and later for gathering evidence for his appeal. To substantiate Azuma's claim, the Chinese historians located a 1936 map, which indicated the pond opposite the then Supreme Court building as he had written in his journal. At his request, they also conducted a live test gauging the timing of a hand grenade explosion, which was much disputed in Azuma's court case. To further solidify such evidence to be submitted to the Appeals court in Japan, the local Public Notary certified the test result.⁵

Chinese historians were active throughout. In 1998, they published a book entitled *The Azuma Suit and the Truth of the Nanjing Massacre*, a compilation of day-by-day activities of Japan's Sixteenth Division (to which Azuma belonged) in the Nanjing Massacre. The newly founded Center for the Study of the Nanjing Massacre at the Nanjing Normal University organized a symposium on the Azuma case, attended by over 30, 18 of which read papers. In 1999, Azuma's diary covering the entire war years was published

in Chinese translation.⁶ Many Chinese historians emphasized the value of Azuma's diary as crucial historical evidence. "As we know," one historian noted, "it is no easy task to reveal and establish a truth of history [*lishi zhenxiang*] so as to receive international recognition and attention. It must be based on numerous historical facts that have been verified." In this regard, Azuma filled a major gap in the documentation of the Japanese atrocities in China: testimonies of perpetrators that have been lacking in contrast to those from Chinese or third-party witnesses.⁷ In the meantime, the Chinese also helped to fortify Azuma's claim to truth-telling.

The Chinese government and historians protested the 1998 court verdict that rejected Azuma's appeal. As Azuma's popularity rose in China as a courageous Japanese confronting the dark past, however, he seemed to be gaining some notoriety in Japan: Azuma was not only condemned by "revisionist historians" and nationalist commentators, he was also shun by progressive academics who had laboriously sought to uncover Japan's wartime excesses. The so-called "Azuma phenomenon"—his great popularity in China in contrast with his less than trustworthy reputation in Japan—has been analyzed in a series of essays by Sun Ge, a Chinese scholar trained in intellectual history,⁸ but has largely escaped observers outside Japan and China. This case raises some of the same issues in the long dispute over the Nanjing Massacre in these two countries: historiography and nationalism. It seems to me this Azuma phenomenon is to be best understood in terms of different regimes of truth.

NATIONALISM, HISTORIOGRAPHY, AND REGIME OF TRUTH

Nationalism, as Ernest Gellner defines it, is primarily a principle that holds that political and national unit should be congruent. It implies that the political obligation to the polity that encompasses and represents the nation overrides all other public obligations.⁹ There is no question that nationalism is not confined to Japan that has often been criticized for lack of repentance for its war responsibility, but also quite evident in countries that frequently make such accusations. Partly as a result of the repeated disputes over

Japan's history textbooks, history textbooks from China and Korea in particular, have also come under scrutiny. To the surprise of many in Japan, the tone of history education in China (and Korea) are more, not less, nationalistic in tone than those in Japanese textbooks that came under criticism.¹⁰

A common observation today attributes Chinese nationalism to the manipulation by the Chinese Communist Party to shore up its own legitimacy. At the same time, many Chinese equate nationalism in Japan as attempts to justify prewar aggression. This is only part of the picture. Nationalism in both China and Japan goes back a long time. Political economists speak of “late development.” A similar phenomenon can be found in the cultural realm: If modern nationalism first developed in Europe, Japan developed its “late-nationalism” since the mid-19th century largely as a reaction to perceived Western encroachment. In this sense, both China and Korea developed their “late-late nationalism” in reaction to both Western and especially Japanese nationalism. This late-late nationalism, in my view, helps us understand the intensity of nationalistic sentiment in both China and Korea.

Yet the nationalist discourse in China also has recent causes, as with the often-repeated emphasis on the importance of “historical facts” in Chinese historiography. History, as one may recall, had been used extensively in the political campaigns launched by Mao—the anti-Lin Biao, anti-Confucius campaign of the early 1970s was perhaps the best example. With fresh memory of these recent events, I entered the History Department in the early 1980s. One of the themes of the time was the so-called “the crisis of the historical profession”. The debate was between “Theory Precedes History” [*yi shi dai lun*] and “History Precedes Theory [*yi lun dai shi*]”. Let me paraphrase: theory in this case refers to the theory of Marxism, Historical Materialism, and quite simply, politically determined principles; history here is what we would call empirical research. Similar debates were going on in China—“Practice Is the Only Criteria of Truth”, came to symbolize the new pragmatism of the Communist leadership under Deng, confirmed the restoration of History before Theory. Indeed, as a result, many new fields

were opened up, and some old orthodox were questioned and dismantled. Class struggle gradually lost its once dominant position as a guiding principle of historical analysis in China. In its place, modern Chinese history has become a history of defending Chinese sovereignty against foreign aggression. Even here, important changes have taken place. Changing political and economic climate helped: the once acrimonious debate over the question “Whether the history of Sino–American relations is simply a history of American aggression against China” died down and is now largely forgotten. The Chinese government now welcomes foreign enterprises in China, once seen as the vanguard of imperialist exploitation.

Thus, the national orientation in China is now intertwined with the new status accorded to historical scholarship and expertise. Studying China's relations with Japan reflects such confluence. The standard refrain in terms of class analysis, only a small group of militarists must be held responsible for Japanese aggression in China whereas the Japanese people are also victims, can still be heard, but less and less effective. Largely in response to the various history–related incidents, the Sino–Japanese War of 1931–45 now appears a hot field. A new journal was founded in 1991 by the prestigious Chinese Academy of Social Science, to be devoted to the study of “the war of resistance against Japan.” A large number of books are published every year on the subject, many of which are compilation of “historical evidence” of all sorts. To be sure, quantity does not equal quality, and there are many problems with these works: Compared with other periods of modern history, one Chinese historian noted in 1995, there are perhaps more difficult issues in the history of the Sino–Japanese War, and Chinese research is least in–depth. In addition to various taboos that had existed before, he pointed out, a major cause is lack of concrete and in–depth study of historical facts (*shishi*). This phenomenon he attributes to the continued influence of “Theory before History”, but also a reflection of lack of basic training among historians.¹¹

Chinese responses to the Azuma case fit this pattern: As with the development of Chinese nationalism in modern time, Chinese reaction to the Azuma case was to a large extent a reflection of how they perceive

present-day Japan. To Chinese readers, the Azuma court case in Japan revealed the “growing influence of the progressive elements among the Japanese people, but also that Japan's rightwing forces still command powerful influence, even over the Japanese government and the judicial branch”. To some extent, such concerns on the Chinese part was justified by media reports that Azuma's accusers in Japan included many who were active in the Nanjing Massacre denial movement: as soon as the judges handed down a “guilty verdict” on the Azuma case, conservative quarters in Japan cheered that the Nanjing Massacre was “declared a fabrication”.

To be sure Azuma is not without supporters in Japan. Although they include individuals from across the ideological spectrum, few historians can be found among them. To many Japanese, however, the Chinese (over)reaction to the Azuma trial confirmed their view that there is no freedom of speech in China and simply demonstrates that ordinary Chinese do not understand contemporary Japan, especially its separation of judicial power from the executive branch. This seems to confirm that the Chinese are not ready to accept conclusions based on pure academic research.

In Japan, modern historiography anchored on objectivism was established in the late 19th century under the influence of the Rankean school. As Stefan Tanaka has shown, this new historiography was most evident in studying the history of *toy*, part of Asia that constituted “Japan's Orient”. Quoting Volosinov, Tanaka argues that “By reviving certain 'worn out ideological sign', historians play a crucial role in imparting a 'supra-class, eternal character to the ideological sign.’ In this context the historian is not just a recorder, but one who creates or affirms a single truth through use of objective facts, a truth that eliminates the contention over meaning and gives the sign its uniaccentual character.”¹² Needless to say, postwar Japanese historical profession is anything but uniaccentual. The Marxist approach of historical materialism still commands considerable influence in academia, and the study of the Fifteen-Year War is no exception. The most ambitious projects on the history of World War II, however, are those of diplomatic and military historians, under the claim of empirical history.¹³ Not surprisingly, “unreliable evidence” is often tantamount to a death sentence for any

academic historian. Interestingly, even a historian like Hata Ikuhiko, who prides himself with practicing “antiquarian historiography” (by focusing on facts only), has been attacked for relying on the grounds that he used “unreliable evidence” of a soldier who confessed to war atrocities but misled about his ranks.¹⁴

To summarize, then, the Azuma case illustrates two different “regimes of truth” regarding the history of the Sino–Japanese War. Whereas Chinese historians tend to place great emphasis on the overall character of the war as Japanese aggression, often at the negligence of “details”; an influential tendency among Japanese historians is their seemingly obsession with details, either ignoring or paying *pro forma* attention to the “big picture”. Chinese historians see as their mission to defend above all the “truth of the war”, and in this regard Azuma’s journal and confession as a whole ring truth, and hence the details of the specific incident, though much disputed in Japan, is not questioned by most Chinese historians. Similarly, a number of photographs of alleged Japanese atrocities in China, while discredited or questioned in Japan, still command undisputed credibility in Chinese publications and museum exhibits. To historians in Japan, this amounts to the lack of respect for empirical research. To borrow a perhaps over-used analogy, Chinese gaze tend to dwell upon the forest whereas the Japanese gaze often focuses on leaves. There seems to be a similar dynamic between Japan and Korea.

HISTORIANS: ONE AMONG MANY

If empiricism is dominant in Japanese academia, where is the danger, then, of postmodernism? Like in China, there are postmodernist critiques, but confined to a small and largely academic group.¹⁵ Yet, in public discourse on issues related to World War II in Japan, one often hears that history is a matter of interpretation. Whereas the postwar trials in Tokyo and China established almost unshakable “facts” for the Chinese, Japanese in general emphasize the “constructedness” and the politics of these “master narratives” —proceedings and hence their verdicts. When politicians like

Ishihara Shintarô and Nagano Shigeto described the massacre in Nanjing as “fabricated” by the Chinese, I indeed wondered how deconstructionists would respond. Whether Japan's war was aggression, said then Prime Minister Takeshita Noboru, must be left to future historians. Proponents of the “new history textbooks” are sometimes more explicit in describing history as “the story of a nation”, hence to co-exist with different but equally reasonable stories of other nations. These were above all political assertions; still, such rhetoric sometimes becomes indistinguishable with post-modernist critiques that all historical narratives were subjective creations.

Here we need to look at the role of historians, as implied in the last part of Foucault's definition—the status of those who are charged with saying what count as true. Can we still rest in the comfortable thought that we are still the custodians of truth in the past? Historians may be good at establishing basic “facts”, sometimes they can be obsessed with the cold fact. Historians generally are not very adept at explaining what their scholarship means to the wider audience, let alone exercising much influence on how history is used. As Carol Gluck pointed out in her survey of postwar Japanese historical consciousness, historians are but one of the groups that influence public discourse on the nation's past: politicians, public commentators, and above all media, all play a large role.¹⁶ Increasingly, such description is becoming true in China: in theory at least, People's Daily editorials no longer define the “whole historical truth”, as in the days of the Cultural Revolution. As Eric Hobsbawm reminded us in his study of nationalism, while nations and their associated phenomena were “essentially constructed from above”, they could not be understood unless analyzed from below, in terms of longings, hopes, interests, assumptions, and needs of ordinary people.¹⁷ In my view, official nationalism is only part of the equation. Increasingly visible is Popular Nationalism. The two did not always converge. There are also other factors at work. It would be over-simplistic to use nationalism to explain everything.

In this sense, the audience should also be considered part of the “regime of truth”. The public finds resonance with official or academic history when the latter resonates with their own experience and perception.

Moreover, participants—as victims and occasionally as perpetrators—command as much authority in authenticating accounts about the past as historians, if not more. What these survivors bring to the table is their experience, perceived to be more authentic and often impart a strong emotional impact. Not surprisingly, emotion plays a large part in the public discourse on issues related to the war. In her analysis of the Azuma case, Sun Ge points out that “the gap between ordinary Chinese and Japanese is above all emotional rather than intellectual. In the so-called historical research, there is no place for such emotional gap, thus left outside the view of researchers”. The “postmodernists” are by no means the only one who emphasize the limits of historical scholarship. In his highly praised study of the Boxer Uprising as event and memory, well-known historian of China Paul Cohen observed that “the very notion that the truth about the past, what historians seeks to attain, is necessary and always of greater value than what people want to believe is true about the past may itself be little more than a myth”. Among various values to the society—moral, intellectual, emotional, and aesthetic—Cohen asks, can historian rank one above others absolutely?¹⁸

Needless to say, none of the political and moral imperatives, or need to attend to human emotion, however, give historians the license to neglect their primary function of seeking truth in the past. In fact, Sun Ge also points to “laziness of thinking” among Chinese intellectuals on the question of war responsibility: that they equate nationalist positions with conclusions. Raw emotions left unattended can be dangerous. As the emotional distance of the younger generation become interactive with the emotional assault of the media, she notes, the greatest danger lies in the “utterly destructive simple combination of the sentiment of narrow nationalism and intellectual attitude that lacks subjective contemplation”.

This raises a question: Should historians be content with simply talking to other professional historians? In other words, what should historians make of the fact that historians seem to exercise little influence on popular historical consciousness. Most best-selling books tend to be by non-historians. Without equating sales figure with degree of influence, one wonders why Kobayashi Yoshinori's cartoon history *Sensoron* became such a

hit. In contrast, in an on-camera discussion on the comfort women issue in the popular Japanese program “Live Television till Dawn”, the voice of the historian of the subject for the most part seemed to be buried. In this area, historian in both Japan and China face a similar challenge: how to stay relevant when a large sector of the public find their historical truth in other sources. I do not profess to know the remedy, but I believe this is a trend that professional historians need to ponder over.

STILL TRANS-NATIONAL HISTORY?

The problematic relationship between the nation-state and history has come to be regarded as a basic cause of much of the “history problems” between Japan and its neighbors. Japanese critic Yamazaki Masakazu even proposes disassociating history with the nation-state, so that history can return to the individual as well as to sub-national, or “ethnic” groups. Not everyone is ready to go that far. Others, like Charles Maier, argue that a historical public can still legitimately ask for a national history—a history of the different peoples and groups in a political territory, insofar as it answers the community's demand for “synthesis”, that synthesis must remain multi-vocal.¹⁹

Can such “synthesis” be extended beyond national borders? One of the basic problems of writing trans-national history between former adversaries is their different power positions, which transform if not determine both experience and perspective—a point postmodernists like to emphasize. For instance, Ueno Chizuko has raised the question at a general level: can victims and perpetrators ever share the same history? As historian Charles Maier put it, victim and perpetrator will not write the same narrative, but can render them both justice within a single story. This does not mean banally insisting that both have a point, or “splitting the difference” (which is a political strategy), Maier reminded us, it means listening to, testing, and ultimately making public their respective sub-narratives or partial stories.²⁰

Even if historians succeed in constructing such a story, bringing it to

a wider audience is by no means easy. When it comes to history education across national borders, they have varying degree of success/failure with history textbooks for middle schools.²¹ It is worth remembering that the first attempt at joint textbook work between Japan and South Korea dates back to the 1960s, at the prodding of the UNESCO. Indeed, much of these academic dialogue reveals obstacles among those small number of scholars involved. Even on the Azuma case, Sun Ge is characteristically blunt: current “collaborative research” on war history (between Japanese and Chinese historians), by and large, is combining exchange at a shallow level with absence of communication at a deeper level. In an essay on the annual dialogue between Chinese and Japanese intellectuals since 1997, Sun again noted the difficulty of language and language environment, national designation versus individual autonomy.²² To a great extent, there are institutional obstacles: in China and Korea textbooks are still compiled by a government-designated committee, although there are signs of change.²³ Chinese history education emphasizes patriotism as a leading objective. In Japan, the government plays the role of setting guidelines and approving textbooks by private groups. History textbooks, according to government-issued guidelines, are supposed to “deepen the love toward the history of our country and cultivate the self-consciousness as a citizen (*kokumin*).”²⁴ A sense of realism is perhaps indeed good medicine. As one Japanese teacher involved in the Japan-Korea exchange pointed out, it would be too impatient to aim at “creating a common history textbook between Japan and Korea” at this time. There are still many hurdles that must be surmounted. However, he also noted that the height of the various hurdles have come down little by little as a result of the exchanges between Japanese and Korean historians and educators.²⁵ If this is true, then there is hope that the endeavor of trans-national history may also move forward between Japanese and Chinese historians over time.

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Can we write history? The title of this workshop reflects of a heightened sense of self-reflection. There is no question that the postmodernist critique and now widely recognized social-political

implications of historiography have made historians more aware of the peril of writing history. If the Azuma case demonstrates that what rings true in one country can be viewed with suspicion and disbelief, can we hope to ever write a trans-national history accepted in both Japan and China?

Saul Friedlander, a leading historian of the Holocaust, once asked: Will this “constantly self-critical gaze” lead to the risks of undue restraint and paralyzing caution.²⁶ Can there be too much “navel gazing”? While such risk can not be dismissed, it is useful to think through the methodological questions as historians set out to pursue trans-national history. Recognizing the different regimes of truth as well as realizing historians’ role in their operations seems to be the first necessary step. One might add that such an endeavor has no finish line. Indeed, it may well be in the persistent pursuit of trans-national history that a trans-national regime of truth will gradually emerge.

NOTES:

¹ For their website see <http://www.fas.harvard.edu/~asiactr/sino-japanese/>

² The 1995 controversy over the Smithsonian exhibition on the atomic bombing is but one recent example. See Edward T. Linenthal and Tom Engelhardt ed., *History Wars: The Enola Gay and Other battles for the American Past* (New York: Metropolitan Books, 1996).

³ *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972–77* (1980), p. 131.

⁴ For an English account on Azuma, see Ian Buruma, *The Wages of Guilt: Memories of War in Germany and Japan* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1994).

⁵ Dong Shilang susongan yu Nanjing Datusha zhengxiang [The Azuma Suit and the truth of the Nanjing Massacre] (Beijing: renmin chubanshe, 1998), Zhongguorenmin kang-Rizhanzheng jinianguan, *Dong Shilang he tade susongan: Yige Riben qin Hua lao bing de fan xing* (Haerbin: Beifang wenyi chubanshe, 2000). Azuma’s diary has been published in Chinese translations in two volumes, *Do Shilang riji* (Nanjing: Jiangsu jianyu chubanshe, 1999), and

Dong Shiliang zhangdi riji, 1938.10–1939.9 (Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 2000).

- ⁶ Li Zongyuan, "'Dong Shilang susongan yu Nanjing datusha zhengxiang' chuban zuotanhui" [A roundtable on the occasion of the publication of Azuma Suit and the Truth of the Nanjing Massacre] *Kang–Ri zhanzheng yanju* 30 (1998); Zhang Lianhong, Xiao Yonghong, "'Dong Shilang susongan' yantaohui," *Kang–Ri zhanzheng yanju* 31 (1999).
- ⁷ Jing Shenghong, "Dong Shilang [Azuma Shirô] susongan de Zhongguo yiyi yu Riben yiyi" [Significance of the Azuma Suit in China and in Japan] *Nanjing shehui kexue* (2001/4).
- ⁸ Sun Ge, "Shihua ruhe shishuo," *Dushu* (March 2000) and "Zhong–Ri chuanmei zhong de zhangzhen jiyi," <http://www.pen123.net>. Japanese translations are published in *Sekai* (2001).
- ⁹ E.J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1870*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, 1992), p. 9.
- ¹⁰ A representative recent book is Komori Yoshihsa, *Nitchusaiko* (Tokyo: Sankei shimbun, 2000)
- ¹¹ Qiu Lu, "Yao keguan zhunque de tantao kangzhan shishi" [Need for objective and accurate examination of historical facts of the War of Resistance] *Zhonggong dangshi yanju* (1995/4).
- ¹² Stefan Tanaka, *Japan's Orient: Rendering Past into History* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), p. 11.
- ¹³ For instance, the seven–volume series *Taiheiyosenso e no michi* and the *Senshi sosho* compiled by the Self Defense Force Agency History Office which ran over 100 volumes.
- ¹⁴ Hata Ikuhiko quoted from the memoir of Sone Kazuo, who was accused by some as a "professional confessor."
- ¹⁵ On the discussion of importance and limits of "empirical" research in studying the comfort women, see Yoshimi Yoshiaki, "Rekishi shiryô wo dou yomu ka," *Sekai* (march 1997); Ueno Chizuko, "Kioku no seijigaku," *Impakushon* 103 (June 1997); Yasumaru Toshio, "'Jugun ianfu' mondai to rekishika no shikoto," *Sekai* (May 1998).
- ¹⁶ Carol Gluck, "The Past in the Present" in Andrew Gordon ed., *Postwar Japan as History* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993)
- ¹⁷ Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1870*, p. 10
- ¹⁸ Paul Cohen, *History in Three Keys* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997).

- ¹⁹ Yamazaki Masakazu, *Rekishi no shinjutsu to seiji no seigi* (Tokyo: Chûô kôron shinsha, 2000); Charles Maier, "Doing History, Doing Justice," in Robert I. Rotberg and Dennis Thompson ed., *Truth v. Justice: The Morality of Truth Commissions* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), pp. 274–275.
- ²⁰ Maier, "Doing History, Doing Justice." Here Maier goes on to a musical analogy: "written history must be contraptunal, not harmonic. That is, it must allow the particular histories of national groups to be woven together linearly alongside each other so that the careful listener can follow them distinctly but simultaneously, hearing the whole together with the parts."
- ²¹ Laura Hein and March Selden ed., *Censoring History: Textbook Nationalism in Japan, US, and Germany* (Armonk, NY: ME Sharpe, 2000).
- ²² Sun Ge, "Quanjihua yu wenhua chayi," <http://dfwh.scnu.edu.cn/20012/20012-f.htm>.
- ²³ A Japan-based Chinese historian Liu Jie mentions one recent textbook in Shanghai that gives greater emphasis to the cosmopolitan outlook. "Nihon to Chugoku no wakai wo mezashite," in Funabashi Yoichi ed., *Ima, rekishi mondai ni dou torikumu ka* (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 2001).
- ²⁴ Quoted in Miura Shumon, *"Rekishi, Komin" zen kyokasho wo kensho suru* (Tokyo: Shogakan, 2001).
- ²⁵ Okada Toshiki, "Nihon to Kankoku no rekishi kyokasho kyodo kenkyu no kokoromi," *Sekai Tokushû* (2001), pp. 121–127.
- ²⁶ Saul Friedlander, *Nazi Germany and the Jews, 1933–1939*, (New York: Harper Collins, 1997), p. 6.